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EXIT AND VOICE:
ORGANIZATIONAL LOYALTY AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION STRATEGIES

Abstract

This study compares workplace dispute resolution strategies (exit, voice, and toleration)
in matched pairs of conventional and worker-owned cooperative organizations operating
in three industries – coal mining, taxicab driving, and organic food distribution. Building
on Hirschman’s classic exit, voice, and loyalty thesis, this research demonstrates how the
degree of loyalty that workers hold affects how they approach workplace problems. I find
that workers with greater loyalty are more likely to embrace “voice” as a way to address
their problems. Although the “exit” patterns do not mirror the classic “exit-voice
framework,” the data do support Hirschman’s broader thesis, which incorporates
examination of emotional involvement, and entry and exit costs.
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While previous scholars have studied Hirschman’s exit, voice, and loyalty thesis
in the workplace, few have explored workplace loyalty as an orientation that affects voice
and exit, as Hirschman envisioned it (Dowding, John, Mergoupis, and Vugt 2000).
Hirschman asserted that, when confronting workplace problems, people’s two courses of
action were to (1) leave the organization, i.e., “exit”, or (2) stay and express their
displeasure, i.e., “voice.” Some scholars read Hirschman as offering “loyalty” as a third
option, while others see loyalty as a contingency that shapes whether people will “exit”
or “voice.” This paper takes the latter definition. Whereas both “exit” and “voice”
behaviors can send a similar message to the organization, causing it to improve, voice is
the more difficult option (Hirschman 1970). When will people stay and “fight,” and when
will they “cut bait” and leave? Hirschman says that the key to understanding this decision
is the loyalty of the members. Those with greater loyalty are more likely to stay and try to
change the organization from within. This is particularly true if they believe that their
efforts have the power to influence the organization (Hodson 2001). Entry costs further
heighten the likelihood of choosing “voice” rather than “exit,” since those who have
endured difficulty in joining the organization will be less likely to discard their
membership lightly (Hirschman 1970).
Some research suggests that members of worker cooperatives – businesses that
are co-managed and co-owned by their workers – will have greater loyalty than workers
in conventional businesses (e.g., Cornforth, Thomas, Lewis, and Spear 1988; Rothschild
and Whitt 1986). Members of worker cooperatives often have ideological attachments to
their workplace. Sometimes they specifically sought jobs in worker cooperatives; other
times they simply happened upon these jobs, but then became converted to the
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cooperative workplace ideology. Moreover, some worker cooperatives require that their
members pay an amount of money to buy into the cooperative before they may begin
working. Thus, members of worker cooperatives – whether because of self-selection
reasons, or due to factors created by the structure of these businesses – may have greater
loyalty.
To investigate the impact of loyalty on the dispute resolution strategies of exit and
voice, I compare conventional organizations and collectively-run organizations. I
examine three very different industries, comparing one conventional and one cooperative
business in each. Contrasts in loyalty between the conventional and cooperative
organizations are explored to establish the assertion from the literature on cooperatives
that people in cooperatives may have greater loyalty. I then compare how these
differences in loyalty between the cooperatives and conventional businesses affect their
workers dispute resolution behaviors.
I find that members of worker cooperatives express more loyalty to their
organization. These workers are more likely to include “voice” as a way they anticipate
resolving workplace problems. The workers in conventional businesses were less likely
to express much loyalty to their organization and also were less likely to anticipate using
“voice” to resolve workplace problems. Additionally, workers who experienced high
entry or exit costs – i.e., those in the coal mining industry – were especially unlikely to
consider leaving the company (“exit”) as a way to resolve problems.

Theoretical Context and Previous Research
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This article draws on the classic writings of Albert O. Hirschman as well as
research on worker cooperatives. Hirschman posited that, when facing negative
situations, workers have two main options: exit the organization or voice their concerns.
Which option they choose depends on how loyal they are to the business. The literature
suggests that members of worker cooperatives are often more loyal to their workplace.
Therefore, by studying matched sets of conventional businesses and worker cooperatives,
this paper explores how loyalty affects workers’ choice of dispute resolution strategies.

EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY
In his influential 1970’s book, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty, Hirschman asserted that
two “contrasting, but not mutually exclusive” (1970: 15) behavior options exist for
employees who are dissatisfied with a firm or a product: (1) “exit”: they can leave the
firm or stop buying the product, or (2) “voice”: they can express their dissatisfaction to
the relevant authority (1970: 4). Additionally, dissatisfied people could also engage in
“acquiescence” rather than either “voice” or “exit,” meaning that they would remain
“dumbly faithful” to the firm or product without leaving or voicing their discontent
(1970: 31). (In this article, I operationalize “acquiescence” as the category “toleration,”
meaning that the problem is perceived but no action is taken.) However, only “voice” and
“exit” provide the feedback that enables organizations to improve. When the “exit”
option is unavailable, the only way dissatisfied people can communicate their
dissatisfaction is with “voice,” so that “the role of voice would increase as the
opportunities for exit decline” (Hirschman 1970: 34). Thus, in situations where one
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cannot exit or the cost of exit is particularly high (such as membership in one’s family,
state, or church), the “voice” option is the only way to express displeasure.
When both “exit” and “voice” are options, the decision to exit or remain will be
affected by how effective “voice” would be. If workers “are sufficiently convinced that
voice will be effective, then they may well postpone exit...[T]herefore, exit can also be
viewed as depending on the ability and willingness of the [workers] to take up the voice
option...[since] once you have exited, you have lost the opportunity for voice, but not
vice versa” (Hirschman 1970: 37). Other research, such as that on whistle-blowers,
demonstrates that sometimes workers go outside their organization and whistle-blow only
after their voices have been ignored by the supervisors they turned to (Rothschild and
Miethe 1999). This supports Hirschman’s argument that exit is closely linked to voice.
Loyalty is the key to understanding which conditions favor “exit” versus “voice.”
Sometimes “loyalty” is defined as a possible action, similar to “acquiescence,” while
others read Hirschman as defining “loyalty” as a contingency that shapes outcomes,
rather than an outcome itself (Dowding, John, Mergoupis, and Vugt 2000: 447). This
paper embraces this second, and more frequently used, definition of Hirschman’s
“loyalty.” This study defines loyalty as allegiance to a concept outside of the self, such as
an organization. The presence or absence of loyalty affects what courses of action
individuals will choose, such as whether to continue in an unpleasant circumstance but
voice their unhappiness or to exit the unpleasant circumstances.
When Hirschman defines “loyalty” as loyalty to the organization, he posits that
people who have an “exit” option will stay and, instead, engage in “voice” if (1) they're
willing to forgo the certainty of exit and embrace the uncertainty of possible
-6-

improvement and (2) they believe they can influence the organization. In this way,
“loyalty holds exit at bay and activates voice” in that it lessens the attractive ease of
exiting by raising the cost of exit, making the exertion needed for “voice” less
unappealing (1970: 78). Yet, “voice” is most effective when “backed up by the threat of
exit” (1970: 82).
High entry costs can affect the timing of “voice” and “exit,” although Hirschman
emphasizes that high entry costs do not cause acquiescence, but, instead, promote greater
voice. Those who have paid dearly to enter will be both disinclined to exit readily or to
stay and remain passive, but rather will embrace “voice” to address the problems they
see. High exit costs might have a similar effect: those for whom exit demands great
sacrifice will be hesitant to exit and will, instead, consider the option of voice (Hirschman
1970).
Hirschman’s “loyalty” is often only applied within the context of the organization,
i.e., loyalty to the firm itself. Other times, however, “loyalty” is examined both with
regard to loyalty to the organization as well as to loyalty to the industry or to industryrelated ideals or goals. For example, Perrucci et al. examined whistle-blowing and found
that sometimes employees may have less loyalty to the specific firm, but more loyalty to
the industry or to certain ideals (Perrucci, Anderson, Schendel, and Trachtman 1980).
Other researchers have explored concepts similar to loyalty, such as allegiance,
commitment, and attachment. This study’s specific definition of loyalty is somewhat
similar to the definition of organizational commitment, suggested by Meyer and Allen
(1997), which describes commitment as having three components: affective, normative,
and continuance. They define affective commitment as an employee’s emotional
-7-

attachment to, and identification with, the workplace. Normative commitment refers to
commitment out of obligation or feelings of moral responsibility. Continuance
commitment – the more rational-choice, cost-benefit component of commitment – is
defined as commitment to the organization because the employee needs the income of
that job (Meyer and Allen 1997).
The definition of organizational loyalty this project uses somewhat parallels this
definition of commitment. Loyalty, as an allegiance to a concept outside the self (as
mentioned above) has two components: an emotional/affective component and a goal
allegiance component. The emotional/affective component mirrors the affective
component of Meyer and Allen: it involves workers’ identification with, and emotional
attachment to, their workplaces. The goal allegiance component addresses the loyalty
employees feel toward an organization when that organization exemplifies or agrees with
their own broader goals; this is similar to Meyer and Allen’s normative commitment. An
example of this would be the worker who feels strongly about the environment and
recycling waste and feels great commitment to his recycling job because it’s in
accordance with his goals regarding helping the environment. This project’s theory of
organizational loyalty does not have a component that parallels continuance commitment,
since loyalty in this context is conceptualized as allegiance which surpasses more selffocused concerns, such as personal income. Throughout my discussion of the data below,
I will occasionally highlight how a particular quotation illustrates each of these
components

WORKER COOPERATIVES’ POSSIBILITIES
-8-

Worker cooperatives, organizations in which all employees collectively manage
and own the business, pose an intriguing arena for exploration of Hirschman’s thesis.
Some researchers assert that the benefits of co-ownership and greater participation result
in stronger loyalty to the organization, as well as heightened worker satisfaction and
greater productivity (e.g., Hodson 2001; Hyde 1991; Kanter 1972; Linehan and Tucker
1983). Members of worker cooperatives may have greater loyalty to their workplaces
than employees of conventional businesses due to the members’ ideological commitment
to this particular type of organization, the “buy-in” cost of putting forward one’s own
capital to join the business, or both. Indeed, the extant literature demonstrates that simply
owning a share of the business (e.g., Employee Stock Option Plans) may not be enough
to produce greater loyalty. Collective management and worker participation also appear
to be necessary (Cornforth, Thomas, Lewis, and Spear 1988). Indeed, some studies
indicate that the opportunity to participate in how one’s workplace is run can
significantly effect how employees feel towards the organization (Hodson 2001).
However, the “flip side” of this greater loyalty is that members of worker cooperatives
may also have higher expectations for the organization to which they have entrusted their
loyalty thereby increasing the probability of greater dissatisfaction (Rothschild and Whitt
1986).
Usually at least some portion of the coop members self-select into the
organization (Rothschild and Whitt 1986). This decision to actively find a cooperative
workplace is an example of loyalty before actual employment began. Even a worker, who
may have entered the cooperative workplace with little loyalty and commitment, may
develop such sentiments once a member. The new experience (in contrast to previous
-9-

jobs in conventional workplaces) of greater worker input and freedom to participate in
managerial decisions can transform a new member into a strongly committed worker
cooperative loyalist (Jackall and Levin 1984). The new experiences with cooperative
management, including respect and appreciation from worker-managers, can have a
profound effect on how the worker perceives the organization (Hodson 2001).

Sampling and Methods
I used the comparative case method to explore the effect of loyalty on “toleration”
(similar to Hirschman’s “acquiescence”), “exit,” and “voice,” particularly “voice” as seen
in workplace grievance resolution (Ragin 1987). I interviewed and observed workers in
three industries: coal mining, taxicab driving, and organic food distribution. Within each
industry, I studied a worker cooperative and a matched conventional business. The
industries in this study offered a range of workplace cultures, gender balances, and business
objectives. I visited each business twice, observing as well as interviewing workers and
achieving variation in interviewees on many dimensions. The duration of the visits ranged
from a few days to two weeks.

SAMPLE
I conducted a total of 128 interviews: 18 at HealthBite Distributors, 35 at Organix
Coop, 14 at Private Taxi, 20 at Coop Cab, and 41 at Coal Cooperative/Valley Colliery.
(Coal Cooperative and Valley Colliery were the same physical mine, but under different
ownership and management systems, as explained below.) For each site, Table One
provides summary statistics on the interviewees as well as on the organizations,
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themselves. I did not identify a specific group of workers whom I knew to have had
“disputes” but spoke to all interviewees about their workplace experiences generally. I
included a wide variety of interviewees to maximize the range of problems and
experiences as well as the variety of solutions and expectations to be included in this
study. My sample included present and former employees as well as managers and
worker-managers. Interviewees also differed in terms of length of employment, sex, race,
age, level of education, socioeconomic status, and section of the particular business.
Through careful sampling and the repetition of responses I encountered as interviewees
spoke of similar themes, I have become confident that my findings are well triangulated
and valid. Although these interviewees are not statistically representative of all the
workers at their individual organizations, the diversity of this sample is helpful in
developing conceptual models.

Table 1 about here

Selection of Industries and Organizations. The interviewees were drawn from six
worksites in three industries: (1) coal mining, (2) taxicab driving, and (3) organic food
distribution. The industries ranged from the coal mining industry where the workers are
very pro-union, to the non-conformist- or loner-oriented taxicab industry, and the
progressively-oriented organic food industry. The industries also ranged from having a
predominantly male workplace culture, such as coal mining, to being less explicitly
gendered, such as the organic food industry. These differences in workplace culture are
somewhat reflected in the industries’ different gender balances: 50:1 men to women at
- 11 -

the coal mines, 5:1 in taxi driving, and 1:1 in organic food. Table One provides a
summary of the organizational attributes of each business.
All businesses in this study met several key criteria. First, the company needed to
have a formal system for grievance resolution. Second, it had to be sufficiently large that
a formal grievance system was necessary. For this study, the minimum size of an
organization was 30 workers. Third, each business had to be a stable organization with
established procedures; none was less than two years old. Fourth, no organization could
be part of a larger organization. Additionally, each cooperative included in the study had
to be a true worker cooperative – with all employees being equal shareholders and no
outside shareholders – not merely an Employee Stock Option Plan (ESOP) company.
Within each industry, I compared a worker cooperative (non-hierarchical
workplace in which all workers are co-managers and co-owners) to a conventional,
hierarchical business matched in size and gender ratios. The coal mining and organic
food distribution were studied in the United Kingdom (U.K); the taxicab industry was
studied in the United States (U.S.). Because these two cultures are sufficiently similar, no
cross-cultural comparison is included in this study. Admittedly, people are more classconscious in the U.K., but fundamental disputing culture, as seen in the two legal
systems, is sufficiently similar (Wheeler, Klaas, and Rojot 1994).
The businesses are summarized in Table One. I looked at two organic food
distributors: Organix Coop, a worker cooperative located in the mid-North of England,
and HealthBite, a conventional business located near London. As organic food
distributors only, they do not produce any of their products: organic produce or foods
made from organic produce and with minimal processing. While some workers in the
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industry describe the attraction of these jobs as simply the need for a paycheck, others
spoke of their dedication to the organic and whole food movement and saw the jobs as a
type of activism. Organix Coop was begun over 20 years ago by progressive college
students who wanted to create a better, healthier, more egalitarian work environment.
This consciousness of the worker cooperative ideology still permeates the business.
Workers at Organix Coop became members after completing a probationary period and
being voted into membership by the current members. Once they became members, they
received their part of the company’s profits, as well as wages, and became “vested” in the
company, with each worker owning a single share of stock, regardless of tenure. When
they left the cooperative, they would have to sell their share back to the company,
generating a type of severance pay.
Both the conventional taxicab company (Private Taxi) and the cooperative taxicab
company (Coop Cab) are located in the same Midwestern town, whose alias is
Prairieville. Coop Cab was begun over 20 years ago by cab drivers who were out of work
due to strikes at two of the city’s main taxicab companies. Possibly affected by its
location in a Big Ten university town, known for its progressive politics (both cab
companies reputably had “overly-educated” drivers, often with advanced, even doctoral,
degrees (Langway 1997)), Coop Cab embraced the worker cooperative ideology in trying
to create a better workplace, although not as strongly, uniformly, or dogmatically as
Organix Coop above. Workers at the cooperative, Coop Cab, became members once they
had successfully completed a probationary period as determined by the membership
committee. Once members, they shared in the profits of the company in addition to their
wages.
- 13 -

Finally, Valley Colliery and Coal Cooperative were “deep-pit” mines, meaning
deep underground mining, as opposed to strip mining. The two coal mines in this study
were actually the same physical mine under two very different systems of ownership and
management. All interviews for both Valley Colliery and Coal Cooperative were
conducted several years after the re-opening of the mine as a cooperative. The alias
“Valley Colliery” refers to this mine when it was nationally owned by the British Coal
Board, while “Coal Cooperative” refers to the mine once it became a worker cooperative.
This mine, located in Wales, U.K., was the last deep pit in Wales and one of the few left
in the U.K. As such, employment at the mine – both when it was still part of British Coal
and after it became a worker cooperative – held important cultural significance for the
miners, who deeply identified with the mining occupation. During the period between the
closing of the mine by the Coal Board and its reopening as a cooperative, some out-ofwork miners took factory jobs, the only other jobs in the area. They described them with
much contempt, often saying that they would rather go on government assistance than
work there again. Once the mine was re-opened as a cooperative, workers had to become
members before they could begin work at the mine. In order to participate, each worker
had to buy a single share of the cooperative at approximately $13,000. As with the other
two cooperatives, this share entitled the member to profit sharing as well as wages. When
the worker left the coop, this share would be bought back by the company.

METHODS
One of the key benefits of qualitative studies is the high validity possible: the
researcher can understand the greater context, obtain a large overview, and can
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triangulate the accounts of differently situated interviewees with various bases of
knowledge. I employed a qualitative comparative case method to study three very
different industries, each with one cooperative and one conventional organization. In
gathering data for this study, I interviewed workers; observed behavior; read related
documents and articles; attended companies’ business meetings and, when possible,
grievance hearings; and participated in aspects of some businesses (e.g., went down into
the coal pit, rode along in the taxicabs).
The interviews ranged from twenty minutes to over five hours, with most lasting
between thirty and ninety minutes. At least one especially lengthy interview occurred at
each business. All interviews and most site observations were tape-recorded and
transcribed, so all quotes used here are direct quotes. These data were analyzed using the
qualitative data software NVivo.
The main focus of the interviews was how the interviewee would handle
potentially grievable circumstances. Interviewees were asked mostly general, open-ended
questions, but with some direct questions, especially as follow-up inquiries. In discussing
grievance resolution strategies respondents would often draw on examples from their past
experiences.
The transcribed interviews were coded, using NVivo, for various themes. Some of
these themes were responses to explicit questions (e.g., “In what ways is your job
difficult?”). However, many others were extracted from the responses of interviewees to
broader questions (e.g., “How would you describe your job?” “How would you
recommend/criticize your job to another worker in the same industry?” “What would you
change about your job if you could just snap your fingers and it would be different?”) or
- 15 -

to follow up questions to other responses. Thus, many codes, such as “loyalty,” were not
the result of a direct question or set of questions intended to measure loyalty, but were
produced by careful analysis of interviewees’ responses to various questions.

Results and Discussion
One key voice mechanism that Hirschman mentions is grievance raising (1970).
In this article, I focus on how this specific voice mechanism of grievance raising works
differently in organizations with greater and less workplace loyalty. I operationalize
“grievance raising” as bringing forward both formal and informal grievances, and define
strikes as a type of formal grievance.
After assessing that worker cooperative members truly did hold greater loyalty to
their organization than did their counterparts in conventional organizations, I compared
how these two groups of workers addressed workplace problems. They mentioned three
dispute resolution strategies: raising a grievance (“voice”), learning to cope with the
problem (what I call “toleration” and is a rough equivalent of Hirschman’s
“acquiescence”), and quitting their job altogether (“exit”). Although “exit” and
“toleration” are not actually ways to resolve disputes, they are strategies workers use to
end the conflict in their work lives.

LOYALTY
I did not simply assume that members of worker cooperatives would have greater
loyalty to their organizations, although the literature strongly indicated this. Rather, I
compared the statements of the worker cooperative members with the employees in the
- 16 -

other conventional businesses. The worker cooperative members consistently made
statements about their loyalty to the organization (92%). While the conventional business
employees spoke infrequently about loyalty, when they did express such sentiments, they
spoke of loyalty to the industry as a whole.
For example, a member of the taxicab coop described the high level of loyalty to
the cooperative which was echoed by many other coop members.
Yet they choose to stick with [Coop Cab] because they believe in the
cooperative and they feel a loyalty to the cooperative. I think there’s
something that’s very good about that...Because they believe that the way
the coops are structured is a lot more beneficial to the workers. And the
coops tend to deal with issues that help the community and they’re more
community-oriented than profit-making. So having a loyalty to that
motivation is, in my mind, a better motivation than going someplace
where your wages might be higher, but you’re not necessarily supporting
something that’s community-oriented, community-based. [052]
This statement provides a good example of the goal allegiance component of loyalty.
The members at Coal Coop spoke of both loyalty to the organization as well as
loyalty to each other. The quotation below offers an example of the affective component
of loyalty.
They’re very protective...You can tease yourself and laugh about each
other, you know, as a part of the system, but if anybody else tries to hurt [a
co-worker], he's one of the pack then and you look after him and defend
him before anybody [whether] he is young, he is new in the industry,
- 17 -

[regardless, you’ve] got to protect him...I think the bond is definitely
stronger underground. But I would say the washery down there, them men
there, have also got a bond, a bond to friendship and loyalty with
themselves. [113]
Similarly, one of the workers at Organix Coop described her loyalty to the organization
as appreciating the uniqueness of the cooperative work environment.
You’re part of a special organization...Sometimes it's about this special
feeling because [for example] you're working individually, but you don't
finish until everyone finished. There were so many things that were going
to go out [for shipment]...The work was always done at the end of the day.
And, ideally, it was done as a team at the end of the day. You run around
like mad and helped everybody else...In a [conventional] workplace,
you’re expected to just do your own job and go home. No one cares [in
those businesses]. [138]
Thus, the distinctiveness of being a member of a cooperative and the bonds forged with
other members created a great deal of loyalty.
This was not found in the sentiments of their peer workers employed by matched
conventional businesses. For example, one worker from HealthBite provides a concise, if
dramatic, articulation of the sentiment of being simply a hired hand.
If you have a problem, good luck! We’ve got a complaint procedure we go
to if we got a complaint about something or anything like that. They try
and solve it. But, really, we’re on our own. [086]
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Although the conventional business employees did mention loyalty to the goals of
industry (such as HealthBite workers’ commitment to organic and whole foods), these
workers generally did not mention loyalty to the organization or to co-workers.

VOICE AND LOYALTY
The absence of organizational loyalty among these conventional-organization
employees made them less likely to include “voice” in their dispute resolution strategies.
In contrast, the presence of loyalty made the worker cooperative members more likely to
anticipate engaging in “voice.” Comparing each percentage within each industry, the
cooperative members are more likely to engage in dispute resolution (how this article is
operationalizing “voice”) than their same-industry conventional counterparts, as Table
Two shows.
Table Three presents the frequencies of the employees in each type of
organization, showing how many expressed loyalty and how many in each category
indicated voice, toleration, or exit. Table Three presents only the raw numbers, rather
than the percentages, to enable the reader to make comparisons across the table. For
example, using Table Three, the reader can compare employees who expressed loyalty in
each industry, can contrast employees who expressed loyalty with employees who did not
express loyalty within a single industry, or can compare the responses of employees in
hierarchical and cooperative businesses across the industries. Table Three clearly
demonstrates that workers who expressed loyalty were more likely to engage in voice
than workers who did not express loyalty and that cooperatives were more likely to have
members who expressed loyalty.
- 19 -

Table 2 about here
Table 3 about here

Taxicab Industry The responses of workers in the taxicab industry offer strong
support for Hirschman’s exit, voice, and loyalty thesis. The members of Coop Cab were
much more likely (100%) to describe a type of “voice” (formal or informal grievances)
when explaining their dispute resolution strategies, in contrast to those in Private Taxi
who less frequently mentioned “voice” strategies (57%). For example, one woman from
Coop Cab explained that sometimes one had to speak up and bring a grievance if a
decision happened that harmed the cooperative in someway, even if one did not
experience that harm directly oneself.
I felt that [the worker manager] had really screwed up...[That policy
decision] totally went against what a cooperative should do. Now, I could
have just left it at that...In a way, it wasn’t going to really affect me. But I
had a duty to say something [and bring a grievance]...Just as [the worker
manager] is a co-owner, I’m a co-owner and its my coop, too. [062]
This quotation illustrates both the affective and goal allegiance components of
organizational loyalty.
In contrast, workers at Private Taxi were more likely to take a more informal
route when they tried to resolve their grievances. A Private Taxi driver explained that
people try whatever means they can, with whomever they can, when they attempt to
resolve grievances informally.
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Everyone goes to whoever they think they’re gonna get some satisfaction
from. If someone has a good relationship with [the owner], then they’ll
probably go to [him] and see what they can do. If someone has a good
relationship with [the manager], at this point in time, they’ll go to [him] to
see what they can do. In some cases, people will go to the dispatcher and
say, ‘Hey, you know, listen, I got this problem with this guy that’s doing
this other shift, and I feel like he’s screwed me over. Or whatever.’ [063]
Given the above pattern, it is not surprising that Private Taxi employees were more likely
to have “toleration” among their dispute resolution strategies (36% as opposed to Coop
Cab’s 5%). A man from Private Taxi, for example, described how he has come to quietly
accept injustices on the road:
First couple of years I worked here, I’d tell the dispatcher [if another
driver cheated me]...[Now] how do I handle it? I used to complain to the
dispatcher. He said, ‘I’ll get you another ride.’ I said, ‘That doesn’t settle
nothing!’ I told management about it. They didn’t do nothing about it.
They didn’t reprimand the driver or anything like that. So after a couple of
years, I just ignored it. If somebody’s stealing my ride, I’d just say, ‘Well
somebody else got the ride.’ I just stay real calm because I know it ain’t
gonna do no good to complain on it. You can’t get uptight about it. [107]
Thus, for some Private Taxi workers, learning to tolerate problematic situations was
preferred to actively trying to resolve the problem.
The pattern for “exit” dispute resolution strategies was the reverse of the patterns
seen with “voice,” as Hirschman would have predicted. Thirty-six percent of Private Taxi
- 21 -

employees included quitting in their dispute resolution strategies, while only 20% of
Coop Cab workers did. This twenty-four-year-old taxicab driver explained that the lack
of long-term career potential meant that one could always exit.
The ultimate thing is, we can always quit. It’s just cab driving. It’s a nice
job, but it’s just a job. It’s just cab driving. It’s not like it’s a profession.
You can always quit. [108]
However, it should be noted that the lack of long-term career potential and minimal exit
and entry costs were also true for the workers at Coop Cab, yet they did not embrace this
“we can always quit” approach. In fact, when Coop Cab workers did say that they would
quit, they often stated doing so because they were loyal to the cooperative and its ideals.
For example, some said that if “wrongful” policies were adopted or poor decisions were
made that they felt compromised the cooperative’s integrity, they would quit as a form of
protest. A similar attitude about exit was voiced by the members of the organic food
cooperative, Below, I quote a member of Organix Coop to illustrate this approach.

Organic Food Industry Workers at Organix Coop would talk about how they had
heard about the worker cooperative from friends and intentionally sought out Organix
because they wanted a cooperative work environment. Some described how they had left
more highly paid jobs in the private sector to take a job at Organix to be part of a worker
cooperative. In contrast, HealthBite workers often described their motivation for their job
at HealthBite as focusing on their paycheck. Although some were motivated by a
commitment to the organics movement, others saw their jobs simply as an easily
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accessible, low-skill job which provided a decent wage. Most stumbled into their current
jobs through word-of-mouth or through answering ads in the newspaper.
Members of the worker cooperative were much more likely (91%) to mention
“voice” (formal or informal grievances) as one of their dispute resolution strategies than
their counterparts in the conventional organic food company (56%).
Sometimes Organix Coop members preferred informal routes:
I tend not to go to the meetings. I like to chat things up in the pub [with
the people involved]. That’s just the way I like to do it. [007]
Other times they preferred formal grievance resolution, such as this Organix Coop member
who described an instance when he felt frustrated with some aspects of the organization.
It was just that the department wasn’t acting in the way I wanted it to
work. My relationship with the department was suffering and I thought
that I couldn’t get on with my job, so I took the whole of the department to
grievance. It turned out that there was something available to me in terms
of information or the way my job could be done to work better. So we
worked it out quite well...I [had been] frustrated; I [had] thought about just
leaving. Find something else...But I stayed and I saw it out. That wasn’t
the easy path, but stayed because I care [about Organix Coop]. [145]
Rather than quitting or “suffering in silence,” he raised a formal grievance against his
entire department. His description provides an example of the affective component of
organizational loyalty.
The employees at HealthBite were less likely (56%) to attempt to actually resolve
their workplace problems, but when they did, they were more likely to rely on resolving
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grievance informally (not reflected in Table Two, but see (Hoffmann 2003) for a
discussion of formal versus informal dispute resolution in the taxicab industry). For
example, one senior woman from HealthBite explained how she engaged in informal
grievance resolution on behalf of other workers as well as herself.
I’m the strong character, so I pretty much stand up for myself...There’ve
been occasions when there’ve been female members here on some
occasions when they felt that there’ve been injustices and they’ve come to
me. And I’ve sort of pushed on their behalf because I’ve worked more
closely with [the two owners] and maybe I know them better than some of
the other staff. And maybe the staff feel they can’t approach the directors
or they’re not sure how they’ll take something or whatever. So I’ll quite
happily go in there with them or go in there on their behalf and say ‘Soand-so is not happy with this,’ [or] ‘They feel that they should be on a
higher rate because of that.’ [143]
Although this quote shows a conventional-organization worker who does include “voice”
among her strategies, it also highlights how her co-workers do not feel able to engage in
the informal grievance resolution that she does. These co-workers were not able to
engage in “voice” and eventually exited.
Understandably given the “voice” pattern above, “toleration” strategies were more
frequently mentioned by workers at HealthBite (61%) than at Organix Coop (29%). A
representative employee at HealthBite explained that often his preferred path is to do
nothing.
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If someone else isn’t doing their work and I’m doing it all, what I’ve
learned in the past, is to just shut your mouth and keep doing it. ‘Cause
that’s how it works. I just shut up and keep doing it. [059]
These employees had developed various ways to cope with problems they could not or
would not resolve. Their ability to tolerate allowed them to avoid any sort of grievance
resolution and to remain in their jobs.
Both the “voice” and “toleration” patterns in the organic food industry clearly
support Hirschman’s model. The “exit” patterns, however, do not follow the basic “exitvoice framework” but do support Hirschman’s broader thesis, as I discuss below. In the
organic food industry, a somewhat higher percentage of worker cooperative members
mentioned quitting their jobs as a way to resolve workplace problems (23%) than did
their counterparts in the conventional company (17%).
Workers at HealthBite who mentioned “exit” as a strategy felt that quitting was an
easy option if they found themselves unhappy at their jobs because such jobs are easily
replaced and, therefore, quite disposable.
What I’m getting here, I know I could get in another job. I can go to an
agency and get another job. So I’m not fighting for a career here. It’s just a
casual job and I’m not gonna fight to keep it. If there was something I
really couldn’t stand, then I would move on. [159]
However, workers at Organix Coop explained that they would quit – not because they
could find another similar job easily – but if they felt betrayed by the cooperative. For
example, one woman said that if she felt sufficiently upset to bring a grievance, she
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would probably leave rather than raising the formal grievance, illustrating irony of the
goal allegiance component of loyalty:
I think if I felt I was in a position where I was wanting to take another
member of Organix to grievance, then I probably would leave. I’d just feel
that I’d been let down too badly [at that point]. [010]
Thus, although the percentages (23% at Organix Coop; 17% at HealthBite) do not reflect
what Hirschman might have predicted with regard to “exit,” the reasons for “exit” fit well
into Hirschman’s thesis. Hirschman asserts that “those [workers] who care the most [sic]
about the quality of the product and who, therefore, are those who would be the most
active, reliable, and creative agents of voice are, for that very reason, also those who are
apparently likely to exit first in cases of deterioration” (1970: 47). Therefore, it is
interesting to note that Organix Coop, the coop with the greatest cooperative ideology
zeal (see above descriptions of businesses), is also the coop where its members report
more “exit” strategies. Indeed, the anticipated use of exit by the Organix Coop members
in the event of frustration with or betrayal by the cooperative supports Hirschman’s thesis
in that it is these people, who most care about the organization as a concept, who are also
more likely to consider “exit.”

Coal Industry The percentages of various interviewee responses within the coal
industry offer the least support for Hirschman’s thesis in some ways. Yet, in other ways,
the industry acts much as Hirschman would predict.
Here, the percentages of workers who mentioned raising a grievance either
formally or informally (“voice”) was very similar for both the cooperative (100%) and
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the conventional business (90%). However, despite this numerical similarity, the range of
topics that workers could raise was much greater in the cooperative. One electrician, for
example, recounted a formal grievance brought soon after the mine reopened as a
cooperative: a grievance about the toilet paper.
Another thing they wanted changed when we came back as a cooperative
was the toilet paper. The toilet paper [the miners used], they were the old
government bloody thick paper. A simple thing like that. And the
managers, under British Coal, their toilets up there, they had the soft,
bloody soft, pink paper. The things like that. Silly little things. But it
matters. It says, ‘I’m no better than that manager over there and he’s no
better than me.’ [129]
For this miner, raising this grievance, despite its somewhat trivial focus, was important; it
demonstrated loyalty (goal allegiance, in particular) to his cooperative’s ideal of equality
among all members.
The variation between the company’s workers regarding mentioning “toleration”
as a strategy does support Hirschman’s framework. Workers at Valley Colliery were five
times more likely to mention developing coping mechanisms as a way for dealing with
problems at work as compared to those at Coal Cooperative. However, the union
chairman described how occasionally this toleration would build at Valley Colliery and
grow into resentment, and eventually explode into formal action (“voice”).
The resentment would build up and build up. Not just one person, dozens
and dozens would build, up until one day something minor might happen.
And, bang! There’s war. It’s strike! What the bloody hell?! It’s been
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building and boiling for months and months because of all those little
incidents that have been happening for weeks and weeks and all of a
sudden, it just blows up, bang! [129]
Other times, the employees would continue silently tolerating disputes, without these
leading to any formal action.
The numbers of workers who mentioned leaving as one of their dispute resolution
strategies (“exit”) were identical: none. No one at either Coal Cooperative or Valley
Colliery mentioned quitting as a possible way to resolve workplace grievances. This could
be tied to the workers expressed concern in preserving their jobs and keeping the mine
open, since many deep-pit mines in the U.K. had already been closed. These miners
expressed concern not with simply keeping a job, but in keeping these jobs. Many of them
had fathers and grandfathers who had been deep-pit coal miners. For them, deep-pit
mining was part of their identity and their heritage.
I think coal miners universally are very much the same sort of people. [In]
these communities here, probably [for] anybody [who] works in [Valley
Colliery], either their father or grandfather or great-grandfather, uncle or
great uncle, was constantly working [in the coal industry]. They been
brought up not only on coal mining when they are in the mine, but
probably the conversation at their home has been about coal mining and in
the pub on Saturday, and the club on Saturday, are predominantly coal
talk. People say their fathers talk with their uncles -- so what are they
going to talk about? -- they talk about what's happening at work: ‘What's
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happening in your pit?’ ‘In my pit?’ So predominantly we come from a
coal culture. [113]
Since the workers saw the jobs at the coal mines as precious commodities, it is not
surprising that no one mentioned leaving.
In fact, Hirschman says that the amount of loyalty often depends on the person’s
identification with the organization or group. Dowding et al. (2000) elaborate on this
aspect of Hirschman’s thesis:
A Londoner may feel loyalty to his country because he is ‘British’, and
that is one of the ways in which he identifies himself. He may retain that
loyalty to his country no matter how much he disagrees with the policies
of the government representing the country. To exit from such a group just
because he disagrees with the policies of the government is an exceedingly
costly and painful process. Similarly a person may feel great loyalty to the
firm for which she works, despite considering its current senior
management to be fools and buffoons ruining the organization (Dowding,
John, Mergoupis, and Vugt 2000: 447).
Indeed, the workers at both of the coal mines – both Valley Colliery and Coal
Cooperative – strongly identify with their particular mine. To leave that organization
would mean to have to change their identity, to reconceptualize who they are. Thus, the
exit costs are extremely high for both groups of miners, resulting in no one considering
“exit” as a possible dispute resolution strategy.
Additionally, as mentioned in the site descriptions of the Sampling and Methods
section above, those miners who were forced to take factory jobs (the only other jobs
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available) between the time of the mine closing and its re-opening as a cooperative,
detested the factory work. They stated that they would rather have no job than to have to
return to factory work. This factory work was small-scale assembly of computer parts,
what more than one miner referred to as “dainty women’s work.” In many ways, the only
way to maintain their identity, particularly their masculine identity (see Cheng 1996;
Connell 1995), was to work in the mines.
Moreover, the mining coop also had the highest entry costs, demanding a $13,000
buy-in by each worker (see Sampling and Methods section, above). Therefore, one might
speculate that the members of the cooperative would be even more reluctant than their
conventional organization counterparts to exit, although one can’t have a rate lower than
zero to actually express this.

Conclusion
SUMMARY
This study examined the impact of loyalty on worker dispute resolution strategies.
Specifically, it compared high-loyalty workplaces (worker cooperatives) with low-loyalty
workplaces (conventional companies). Workers at the high-loyalty workplaces were more
likely to include “voice” among the ways they would resolve workplace problems, while
workers at low-loyalty companies were less likely. Additionally, workers at low-loyalty
companies were more likely to engage in “toleration” strategies (similar to Hirschman’s
acquiescence), a behavior that involved neither “voice” nor “exit.” These “voice” and
“toleration” patterns neatly followed Hirschman’s “exit-voice framework.”
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The “exit” patterns, however, were more complicated. In the taxicab industry, the
“exit” pattern did follow the “exit-voice framework.” In the organic food industry, the
worker cooperative members, not the conventional organization’s employees, were more
likely to include “exit” in their anticipated dispute resolution strategies. Initially, this
seemed contrary to Hirschman’s thesis. However, the reasons why the two groups of
workers considered leaving were very different and support Hirschman’s thesis. The
worker cooperative members’ greater ideological commitment made them, ironically,
both more loyal, but also more likely to become frustrated and consider leaving
(Hirschman 1970; Rothschild and Whitt 1986).
In the coal industry, workers at both the conventional and the cooperative
company did not include “exit” among their dispute resolution strategies. While these
zero percentages do not coincide with the “exit-voice framework,” a further exploration
of this industry shows that these workers’ dispute strategies support Hirschman’s thesis.
This industry had such significant exit costs that the workers in both businesses were
extremely reluctant to leave. Working with coal and in the mines was a central part of
these workers’ identities. To leave these jobs would be to remove a part of themselves.
This level of identification keenly affects loyalty (Hirschman 1970).

REFLECTIONS ON HIRSCHMAN
This analysis suggests certain reformulations of Hirschman’s model. Therefore, I
want to leave the reader with some questions that require additional discussion of the
exit-voice typology.

- 31 -

First, although numerous scholars have debated the question of exactly “what is
‘loyalty’?” – is it a contingency or an outcome? – several important questions about
loyalty remain. Most importantly is an analytic question: from where does “loyalty”
come? How should researchers disentangle loyalty that is linked with the organization
from loyalty that is linked to self-selection, such as the family socialization found in the
coal industry? The mining industry does not fit the classic exit-voice theory and also is
the most “socialized” occupation, perhaps giving loyalty a different meaning – e.g.,
father-son transmission of cultural expectations. Thus, one must ask, how does selfselection into a company or industry – such as the coal miners in this study – coincide
with the concept of “loyalty”? Are these workers “pre-socialized” to be so committed
even before joining the company? If so, does that present a qualitatively different type of
loyalty such that Hirschman’s model needs to re-interpret how loyalty could be in place
before a worker joins the company? Alternatively, can “loyalty” be created within an
organization (such as in the cooperatives)? The work of Hodson, for example, suggests
that how managers treat workers – e.g., whether or not the managers show them respect –
can create greater commitment and loyalty from workers. In this way, organizations may
be able to “create” loyalty by how their managers choose to act towards their workers.
For example, can the opportunity for voice create loyalty, just as loyalty might create the
workers’ desire to voice their concerns? If loyalty can be created, is this “created loyalty”
different from the loyalty that workers may have before joining the company? For
example, do the relationships and commitment of the workers at Coop Cab and Organix
Coop create a different type of loyalty from the loyalty of the coal miners?
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Second, how should scholars take into account the salience of the disputes? How
does the degree of salience have an impact on Hirschman’s exit-voice thesis? Does the
salience of the dispute interact with loyalty in ways that affect the workers’ exit-voice
options? The whistle-blowing literature says that when employees resort to external
authorities because their voice was ignored by their superiors (Rothschild and Miethe
1999), their concerns often involve high-salience disputes (see e.g., Perrucci, Anderson,
Schendel, and Trachtman 1980). However other disputes, such as the example in this
article of a cab driver stealing another driver’s fare, are of less salience. These disputes
are important to the individuals involved at that instant, but they are not so salient as to
transcend further. The statements by worker cooperative members, such as that by the
woman at Organix Cooperative, that they would leave rather than raise a grievance that
would destroy their confidence in the cooperative, indicate grievances with great
salience. Such disputes with greater salience may speak to the workers’ loyalty to the
movement or industry ideals, rather than to the company itself. An important expansion
of Hirschman’s thesis might address this issue of salience and its relationship to loyalty,
as well as to the exit-voice choices.
Third, how do the differences in exit and entry costs – in either a particular
industry or company – affect decisions to “exit” versus “voice”? How does the type of
exit and entry cost matter? For example, how do “psychological exit costs,” such as the
disinclination to leave a job that is a significant part of one’s identity, differ from
monetary exit costs, such as the situation in a cooperative in which someone who left
would have to forfeit any equity she or he had acquired in the company during her or his
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tenure? A reformulation of Hirschman’s model might develop a closer analysis of exit
and entry costs that takes these differences into account.

IMPLICATIONS FOR APPLICATION AND FUTURE RESEARCH
Implications of these findings include some support for Hirschman’s “exit-voice
framework.” The data demonstrate that workers with greater organizational “loyalty” are
more likely to use “voice” when confronted with workplace problems. However, when
workers ideological loyalty surpasses their organizational loyalty, and when these two
loyalties are in conflict – such as if a cooperative no longer meets its egalitarian goals –
even members with high loyalty might resort to “exit.” On an applied level, the findings
imply that simply creating or finding employees with a high level of loyalty is not
sufficient to ensure low turnover. Companies that use motivational techniques to pull
employee support behind the ideological goals of the company may experience greater
“exit” than companies who simply try to generate high employee enthusiasm for the
company itself.
Future research should explore how employees might attempt radical reform in
organizations by using a whistle-blowing form of voice. By holding greater loyalty to
their industry or to an ethic, than they may have to their organization, some employees
might embrace “whistle-blowing grievances.” In doing so, they might significantly alter
some organizations’ objectionable, yet customary, practices and, thereby, significantly
alter how both their own organization and their industry do business.
The research findings also imply that high exit costs, such as those found in the
coal industry, will affect not only the decision to “exit,” but also the decision to “voice.”
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On a practical level, this underscores that no company or industry can be examined in
isolation. The other employment options that are available to workers will have an impact
on their dispute resolution strategies. If unemployment rates are high or the available job
alternatives are unattractive, workers may be disinclined to choose “exit.”
Future research might explore the questions posed above in industries that
demand or create different types of loyalty. For example, some scholars have found that
certain industries have an almost self-sacrificial type of loyalty, such as nursing and
teaching professions (e.g., Abel and Nelson 1990; Grimwood and Popplestone 1993).
This type of loyalty in the caring industries might or might not reflect the same patterns
as those in the three industries studied here.
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Tables
Table 1: Summary of Sites and Interviewees
number of
workers

number
interviewed

Wales
(U.K.)

252

38** (15%)

worker
cooperative

Wales
(U.K.)

239

41** (17%)

conventional

Wisconsin
(U.S.)

120

14 (12%)

worker
cooperative

Wisconsin
(U.S.)

150

20 (13%)

industry

type of
organization

Valley
Colliery

coal mine

conventional

Coal
Cooperative

coal mine

Private Taxi

taxicab
driving

Coop Cab

taxicab
driving

location

HealthBite
Distributors

organic food

conventional

London
(U.K.)

32

18 (56%)

Organix Coop

organic food

worker
cooperative

Halifax
(U.K.)

50

35 (70%)
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Table 2: Dispute Resolution Strategies:
percentages of employees who mentioned each dispute resolution strategy
Taxicab Industry

Whole Foods Industry

Coal Mining Industry

Private
Taxi

Coop
Cab

HealthBite
Distributors

Organix
Coop

Valley
Colliery

Coal
Cooperative

Voice

57%

100%

56%

91%

90%

100%

Toleration

36%

5%

61%

29%

11%

2%

Exit

36%

20%

17%

23%

0%

0%

Percentages sum to greater than 100% in some cases because the categories are not exclusive;
some interviewees mentioned more than one dispute resolution strategy.
note: a “no response” category does not exist. All interviewees provided at least one strategy
(voice, toleration, or exit).

Table 3: Dispute Resolution Strategies:
frequencies of loyal and not loyal employees who mentioned each dispute resolution strategy
Taxicab Industry
hierarchical
loyal

Whole Foods Industry

cooperative

not loyal not
loyal
loyal

hierarchical
loyal

Coal Mining Industry

cooperative

not loyal
loyal

hierarchical

not
loyal

loyal

cooperative

not loyal
loyal

not
loyal

Voice

5

3

18

2

6

4

31

1

32

2

41

0

Toleration

0

5

0

1

1

10

7

3

2

2

1

0

Exit

0

5

0

4

0

3

7

1

0

0

0

0

note: raw numbers, rather than percentages, are provided to allow the reader to make comparisons across
the table.
note: these frequencies are of the number of statements made and total to greater than the number of
interviewees because several interviewees described more than one dispute resolution strategy.
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